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Biosecurity and the Topologies of Infected Life: From borderlines to borderlands

Abstract
Biosecurity, as a response to threats from zoonotic, food borne and emerging infectious diseases, implies and is often understood in terms of a spatial segregation of forms of life, a struggle to separate healthy life from diseased bodies.  While an ensuing will to closure in the name of biosecurity is evident at various sites, things are, in practice and in theory, more intricate than this model would suggest.  There are transactions and transformations that defy easily segmented spaces.  Using multi-species ethnographic work across a range of sites, from wildlife reserves to farms and food processing plants, we argue for a shift of focus in biosecurity away from defined borderlines towards that of borderlands. The latter involves the detachment of borders from geographic territory and highlights the continuous topological interplay and resulting tensions involved in making life live. We use this spatial imagination to call for a different kind of biopolitics and for a shift in what counts as a biosecurity emergency. As a means to re-frame the questions concerning biosecurity, we argue for a change of discourse and practice away from disease ‘breach points’ towards the ‘tipping points’ that can arise in the intense foldings that characterise pathological lives.
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Introduction
Pandemics, epidemics, zoonoses and emerging infectious diseases seem to speak of a generalised threat to life, affecting people, wild animals and livestock as well as plant life. Alarm at the unpredictability and mutability of disease has set in train a wealth of responses, most of which tend to fall under the catch-all of biosecurity. In many respects, biosecurity merely represents a re-branding of the centuries-old battle with disease; the struggle to separate diseased from healthy life, to contain infectious outbreaks and to police the flow and movement of anything potentially threatening to life.  If the impetus has been largely to ‘keep out’ certain things while allowing others to circulate, whether through a version of the ‘high-tech’ barn door on farms and related sites or through the selective restrictions on the circulation of plants, animals, people, tissues and such like, it is equally increasingly recognized that the threat to life that pathogens represent are not easily dealt with by means of a spatial closure or monitored extensions. The drawing of borderlines between healthy and unhealthy bodies poses its own difficulties and problems, not least the fact that being healthy does not necessarily mean being free of pathogens.

As we see it, healthy life is not simply something that is threatened by incursions from the ‘outside’; in a world in which pathogens and life co-evolve, life itself is as likely to be threatened by its very own liveliness, as much as anything else. To make life live, if one can phrase it in the terms of an affirmative biopolitics, involves something more than the practice of drawing borderlines around things. It involves a biopolitics that has to think again about the spatial assumptions that underpin the geometry of disease outbreaks, where pathogens are thought to cross over into healthy lives as if a pure space can somehow exist in contrast to an impure, diseased space. More than that, it involves questioning the maps, the topography of disease, that govern how we understand and respond to outbreaks and epidemics, where security, even one located within “the changing and manifold processes of global circulation” () is often imagined to involve little more than a kind of ‘walling off’ against an ‘outside’ world of infection.

In this paper, we take issue with this fixed disease geometry and we argue against a straightforward mapping of viral traffic and the simple exercise of the power over life to control disease outbreaks through spatial closure and monitored circulations. In their place, we propose an alternative topological ‘mapping’ of disease, a diagram, so to speak, through which disease is understood as relational; that is, both integral to, and always part of, an entangled interplay of environments, hosts, pathogens and humans. Governing wayward life, if that is the right expression, represents less the need to shore up borderlines between the healthy and the diseased and more the requirement to engage with infected life as part of a borderlands within a mutable disease environment.

In what follows, we first outline the disease geometry that tends to conceptualize healthy life and disease as separate spaces, with biosecurity understood as a practice of demarcating and shoring up borderlines. Barrier systems, surveillance networks and the drive towards organizational integration affect a closure whose seeming success can be measured by their ability to control the flow of anything undesirable across map-able terrains and, indeed, across vulnerable, global, interconnected populations. After that, we set out the difference between an infectious model of disease and one where disease is understood as relational, as part of an entangled landscape marked by folds and intensities. Fieldwork on factory farms and food processing plants, on wildlife reserves and in veterinary laboratories in England is drawn upon to explore the entanglements involved and to illustrate the main line of argument. The methodology has been both multi-sited and multispecies (), attendant to the ramifications of animals and microbes that are “on the move” ().  We have effectively explored the viral cloud () that links various sites, species and processes.  It has involved two years of participant observation, interviews with key players and qualitative analyses, generating materials that are drawn on throughout the paper.  In the final section, we go on to show how the twists in the disease relationships that topology traces across humans and non-humans opens up an alternative understanding of bio-politics and biosecurity, one in which the powers of life often fold over into the power over life, and undermine its very possibility.

Biosecurity Borderlines
Despite the late 20th Century promise of the so-called epidemiological transition (), whereby infectious diseases would increasingly be consigned to a pre-modern past, recent decades have seen a resurgence of communicable diseases with global impact.  Notable pandemics and epidemics include AIDS/ HIV (), SARS (; ) and both avian and swine influenzas ().  In the two decades prior to 2001, one estimate suggests that there were 177 new or re-emergent human diseases, three-quarters of which were thought to have originated from animals and animal products ().  Added to these zoonotic diseases that cross between animals and people are some notable epizootics, or diseases of animal populations; namely, Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) and Bovine Tuberculosis (bTB), which have had sizeable effects on animal health and welfare and significant consequences for social and economic life in the UK alone in the last decade  ADDIN EN.CITE (; ; ).  Finally, there are plant pests and diseases and pest plants, with similarly devastating impacts to life and landscape  ADDIN EN.CITE (; ; ).  

This fear of communicable diseases tends to encompass a particular geographical imagination, wherein an increasingly networked planet enhances disease spread.  The contemporary direction of this ‘viral traffic’ is often from ‘zoonotic pools’ in the Global South and East towards the North and West (), a reversal of the pre-colonial tendency for disease to follow empire.   This spread is most often related to the  ‘four Ts’ of trade, travel, transportation and tourism, which have arguably led to a growth in disease introductions within and between nation states ().  Legal, liberalised and illegal trade in animals, plants and their products are implicated in the recent spread of, for example, highly pathological avian influenza, the foot and mouth disease epizootic in the UK and various diseases of plants.  The intercontinental spread of H1N1 Mexican swine flu and SARS, meanwhile, were associated with extensive travel and tourism.  The manifold circulations of globalisation are supplemented by enhanced ‘invasibility’ (), a characteristic of biological simplification, uniformity and extension of crop and livestock systems.  Add to this the conditions of rapid climate change, which can change vector ranges and alter the seasonal cycle of micro-organisms, land use changes (notably deforestation, land drainage, shifts in animal husbandry and urbanisation), and new conditions of possibility have arguably been created for zoonoses, epizootics and plant disease  ADDIN EN.CITE (; ; ; ; ; ). 

These disease threats and their presumed pathways are met with a set of narratives, technologies and practices, which together are increasingly labelled as biosecurity.  As noted in the introduction, in many senses the term marks a re-branding of centuries’ old battles with disease and reflects the flourishing of security thinking and practices in the wake of terrorist attacks in the US in 2001  ADDIN EN.CITE (; ; ).   Techniques dating from the 15th century in Europe designed to minimise disease incursion and spread included isolation and quarantine for both people and animals in response to plague, anthrax and various animal pests.  Along with culls of infected livestock in order to develop disease free herds, such measures were devised prior to modern conceptions of disease and seemingly reinforced by veterinary and health institutions once germ theory established the mechanisms for contagion as largely a matter of microbiological transmission and of the absence or presence of disease agents or pathogens.  These techniques, more recently labelled as bio-exclusion and biocontainment (), as well as zoosanitation, mark what the political theorist Wendy Brown has called (in a different context) a ‘will to closure’ ().  

Within livestock agriculture and particularly in the poultry sector, which is the main focus for us here, this will to closure takes particular forms and makes for particular landscapes.  Here we will briefly review three broad approaches: sanitation, surveillance and the drive towards organizational integration, themes that have emerged from the site visits to farms, poultry processors, retailers and fieldwork with veterinary and animal health practitioners in 2010 and 2011.

Sanitation
In the UK, the most recent ‘closures’ occurred after the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis in the 1990s and during the Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) events of 2001.  While the former involved re-regulation of slaughter processes leading to closures of abattoirs and a centralisation of approved and inspected services, the latter featured the closure of the countryside, the contiguous cull of animals and the implementation of on farm biosecurity measures (ranging from reinforcing mundane processes of washing and cleansing to built forms designed to discipline the movement of bodies and machinery).  These measures have more recently marked the response to bTB in cattle, and have been extended to the countryside in the form of a controversial decision to cleanse the landscape by culling wildlife carriers (; ; ).  Livestock have also been increasingly tagged and traced in order that the provenance and cleanliness of animal bodies and products could be assured.  Biosecurity was therefore not only about ‘clean’ premises, but also about assured processes or networks.  

This ‘closure of the hi-tech barn door’ currently characterises the poultry sector.   After a decade of high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) cases as well as a growing concern with food borne diseases like Campylobacter, poultry farming is increasingly under sanitary pressure, and ‘barrier systems’ are now part of the farming vernacular.  Barrier systems include the structural integrity of buildings and fences, their regular maintenance and general design to prevent incursion of pathogens.  The latter can enter on carriers like people, new livestock, wildlife, clothing, machinery and equipment, or can circulate in water, air and feed.  As the retailers, who increasingly drive this process, capture it, biosecurity takes “practices we would use in a food factory where segregation is critical... and applies them into agriculture” (Retailer Interview, October 2011).  Techniques include: reduced contact between livestock and farmers through automated feed systems; ante-chambers or clean areas for changing, with staff to don, as one set of model farm instructions says, “freshly laundered overalls each day” (farm visit, November 2011); exchange sites where removals of dead stock can be undertaken at the perimeter of the farm; and various technologies for fly and rodent control.  This exclusion of outside unsanitary life is part and parcel of the general practice of on site hygiene.

While some of these sanitary techniques are considered to be a nuisance and even impractical, there are increasing moves to develop on site sanitary procedures as a means of assuring disease free areas and foods.  Indeed, the physical sanitation of livestock farming and food processing is considered to be the first and proper line of bio-defence, one that is implemented in the EU in preference to more controversial (under directive 89/107/ EEC Food Additive and Processing Aids) post-slaughter de-contamination using radiation, bacteriophage or chemical treatment, use of ‘prophylactic’ antibiotics, or consumer based campaigns aimed at reducing disease amplification within consumption practices.  Moreover, as a set of techniques, it re-distributes disease responsibility away from state actors and onto private companies and, in particular, onto farms.  This allows for disease prevention costs to be borne at the farm rather than by the consumer, the retailer, or importantly by the state.  The latter is an explicit intention of the current UK Government’s Animal Health Bill and part of a general move away from state-centred disease planning and control to one of private responsibility and cost sharing (; ).  

Surveillance
The will to closure requires continuous policing in order to provide assurances of disease free status and early warning of any proximate threats to that status, especially in an industry characterised by its manifold circulations (of stock, of feed and so on). Surveillance verifies closure, confirming health on the ‘inside’ and allowing for infringements to be picked up quickly so that disease events can be contained, but it is also part and parcel of a general space of circulation and serves to continually offer assurances that circulations are disease free.  For this to be most effective, a susceptible population is defined and mapped ().

In the UK, in 2006 and with avian influenza a real threat, a new register was implemented for poultry ().  In the event of a notifiable disease occurrence, the record would be used to locate holdings and ensure speedy implementation of a lock down, or containment compliance and enhanced disease surveillance (within circular zones of at least 3 and 10km radius respectively drawn around the infected premises).  The register also constituted a population and could be used to structure routine sampling for avian influenza.  This process is designed to provide early warning of possible disease in order that outbreaks can be identified and contained.

A programme of wild bird surveillance is also mandatory under European Union directives (for example see 2005/94 EC Community measures for the control of avian influenza).  This has involved a varying mix of found dead and live caught birds and has targeted specific pathogens (notably H5N1 HPAI) within migratory and resident wetland species.  The rationale has been predominantly one of early warning, targeting surveillance at wetland sites frequented by migratory birds arriving from Siberia, mainland Europe, Scandinavia and Iceland, and close to areas of above average poultry production.  Again, then, the investment in biosecurity is predominantly focused upon disease incursion and contamination of livestock production systems and beyond this the dangers to public health.  The main recurring theme here is closure with an increasingly wide distribution of borderlines, from farm to wetlands, and the attendant broadening of responsibilities for the nation’s biosecurity.  

Organizational integration
While responsibilities and borderlines are increasingly de-centralised or privatised there is however a countervailing pressure to make biosecurity scalable through the standardization and uniformity of practices; that is to reduce the diversity in practices and environments through a strategy of organizational integration.  Regulation and compliance seem to be more complex in conditions of operational and environmental diversity, and dealing with fewer players and having clear reporting lines are often regarded as enhancing biosecurity implementation.  Disease prevention measures and post-outbreak containment are as a result increasingly the responsibility of private actors, but are delivered through codified, standardised and accredited practices. Larger organizations are broadly assumed to be able to generate biosecurity efficiencies in terms of the size of their operation, their uniform processes, and the ability to absorb initial costs of compliance.  The latter fits with requirements for cost sharing and responsibility, and bows to retailer-led pressure to avoid passing biosecurity costs on to customers.  Private actors at the top end of the food chain, in the main the big retailers and processors, thus assume responsibility for preventing disease reaching the supermarket shelves. The role of the state becomes a matter of defining and delimiting biosecurity (within the norms laid down by food industry), and possibly assuming control during ‘emergencies’ (though with questionable results (see ; )). 

The UK poultry industry, for instance, is dominated by a handful of large corporate players, each with contracts to major retailers and either managerial or ownership based vertical integration of the production process (from farm to wholesale).  The big corporates control breeding, supply the stock, chicks and feed, and the chickens are ‘grown’ (as it is termed) under specified management systems.  As one representative of a major company stressed:  “we are very much in control of the growing programmes and the agricultural side” (Processor interview, March 2011).  The farms where the growing programmes take place are either owned outright or contracted to the processing company, allowing for tight control of biosecurity, with one phone call or letter detailing a new biosecurity procedure able to cover an entire operation totalling millions of birds.  In the industry, biosecurity is perceived to be more effective in tightly coupled, highly integrated production processes, where large organizations can effectively exercise control across the length and breadth of the food chain and design-in barriers and buffers to keep the system disease-free

Taken together, the three approaches - sanitation, surveillance and organizational integration – effectively amount to a will to closure where success is measured by their ability to limit the flow of undesirables across territories and bodies. Although security, more broadly, may be concerned with regulating the flows that make economy and life possible throughout a generic space of operation that Foucault called circulation (), and thereby cannot afford to be all encompassing or entirely prophylactic (), there is clearly a pervasive if never fully realised logic in place whereby attempts are made to enclose circulations in disease free conduits or axes.  This is a walling in of ‘good’ life and a walling out of risky lives.  Safe life is pursued through territorial cleansing acts, where putting one’s own house in order allows an accusatory eye to be fixed firmly on outside causes of disease. Outside and inside are thereby constituted in a kind of geo-biopolitics. So when highly pathogenic avian influenza seemed to move westwards from its Asian heartland in 2003-2006, the epidemiological gaze alighted on the international migrations of wild birds and their prior, unregulated mixing with domestic birds in backyard production facilities in other nation state territories ().  Wild birds along with what Shukin calls distant “interspecies intimates” – often caricatured as the world’s poor living cheek by jowl with their animals - became the outsiders in this spatial performance of health and disease ().  This scapegoating of outsiders is a rather ancient form of disease explanation or sacrificial economy (), but our broader concern is to emphasise the spatial or territorial performances that are involved in performing disease free status.  As we shall see, the efficacy of this will to closure is open to question, and so leads us to challenge the spatial assumptions surrounding disease and security.

The limits to closure
Closure encircles an imagined community.  As others have shown, this is a geopolitical process, whereby biosecurity is played out along familiar lines.  There are particular sovereignties that are often being shored up (; ), and particular forms of economic activity that are being promoted ().  And yet, this approach to life and disease, with its geometrical or Euclidean spaces of inside and outside, its markers of disease presence or absence, is questionable on a number of grounds. In the first place, borders are always also contact points, they join worlds together and act as conduits as well as barriers. Indeed, the permeability of walls is a requirement for life to live, to circulate.  Second, enclosing life is no guarantee of safety.  That which is enclosed may be subject to threats from within.  Finally, the regulation of inevitable border crossings and circulations through surveillance and statistical mapping is underpinned by a geometry of disease outbreaks that has pathogens crossing into populations rather than being already present.  This geometrical mapping is increasingly being undermined by mutable pathogens and discourses of emergency, and suggests that another spatial vocabulary is warranted in both conceiving and practising biosecurity.  We expand on each of these points in turn.

Borders, breaches and threats from within
For Brown, walls are testament to an ongoing and inevitable failure.  They are, she argues, the last attempts to shore up a failing sovereignty, consecrating the very boundary corruption they would contest ().  This last ditch feel to closure is perhaps no more apparent than when the objects to be excluded are sub-microscopic and when the circulations and mobilities of their carriers are so extensive.  Indeed, the inevitable failure of barriers is a characteristic of the emerging infectious disease literature of the last few decades (for example ; ).

This inevitable failure is more than a matter of things crossing over walls, it is also a matter of contact between categories (health and diseases), a ‘hydraulic’ gradient wherein disease free zones ‘attract’ new diseases (), and perhaps most significantly, the promotion of false securities.  In short, walls can, paradoxically, make matters less rather than more safe.  The case of the 2001 FMD outbreak is informative here.  Prevention measures were ostensibly in place, including border controls, World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Organisation International de Epizooties (OIE) sanctioned trade restrictions and domestic regulations on farm activity (). And yet, the distinction between disease free and diseased categories and the conditions behind the wall were germane to the disease’s proliferation (). Increased livestock movements in the 1980s and 1990s, a result of changes to land ownership, market processes and abattoir closures (the latter a result of post-BSE restrictions) inadvertently contributed to the rapid spread of FMD in 2001 (). Part of the problem here is the tendency to address only one side of the division – the excluded category.  In effect, this constructs the inside as a norm, which is threatened only by that which is excluded.  It therefore fails to account for what Perrow famously called ‘normal accidents’, whereby system failure is not so much incurred through invasion from outside, but is embedded within the workings of the system itself ().  

Beyond this illusory if comforting quality of borderlines and the sclerosis that can follow, it is important to remember that walls not only mark attempts to keep things out, they also enclose.  In doing so, they can restrict life and living inside.  They can exclude ‘more’ life, or the excessive and the wild, at the cost of retaining ‘mere’ life, or the barest of living conditions  ().  Walls can enclose both the good and the bad, and can intensify negative aspects of life.  In more prosaic terms, walls may help in the regulation of certain mobilities, but do not address the issue of invasibility.  For Waage and Mumford, there is a need then “to refocus biosecurity on building resilience to invasion into agroecosystems rather than building walls around them” (), though even this does not go far enough, we will argue, as it still presupposes invasion from without, rather than a co-production of disease.

Geometry and disease events
The will to closure is characterised by registration and number.  Indeed, agricultural biosecurity remains a largely statistical affair of mapping populations.  Registers of livestock, randomised stratified sampling as well as risk-based samples are means of establishing a population and providing the kinds of information that inform disease planning.  This is a rationality of calculation and prediction.  As Keck captures it, in relation to French veterinary science practice:

“The rationality of animal epidemiology is a rationality of cases and propagation zones: concepts of prevalence and incidence orient the gaze toward the proliferation of cases in order to make them predictable.  The fight against diseases implies the accumulation of numbers and the delimitation of zones” ().

In this public and animal health model, actual disease episodes inform future planning, relying “on the archival knowledge of the timing and location of outbreaks to design effective interventions” ().  In other words, the past record becomes the key to disease prevention in the future.  Known pathogens, disease histories, predictable pathways and circumstances for infection allow risk probabilities to be calculated.  Probabilistic risk can be used to anticipate disease episodes and develop the necessary resources for alleviation and containment.  This statistical mapping and subsequent regulation of the individually random though, once aggregated, predictable attributes of a population was of course key in allowing nascent states to intervene biopolitically in how life was to be lived (). 

And yet, as Keck and others have detailed, once disease fears become less concerned with prevention of a known pathogen and more focused on mutable pathogens, then a different logic may take effect.  The inevitability of a breach in a defensive wall, coupled with the possibility for incalculable damage to life from a new pathogen, ushers in a rather different temporal register, less based upon extrapolation from the archive and institutional planning, and more upon coping with unpredictable events.  The approach is closer to disaster management than insurance or actuary.  So, the threat posed by a virus like highly pathogenic H5N1 was not so much for its known effects on poultry, but the possibility that it could develop into a highly contagious and pathogenic strain in people.  The potential arises from viral reassortments, where viruses exchange genetic material during a co-infection of a host (normally a pig or a human), to generate a pandemic strain.  Once this strain had developed sufficiently, it could move so quickly that current detection systems based on surveillance and monitoring would be too slow to signal an early warning.  In short, statistically based methods for mapping the disease would be a poor match for newly emerging disease. 

For many commentators, this unpredictability and the fallibility of statistical maps (as well as walls) underpins a shift towards ‘preparedness’, which involves attention turning to ‘living with the possibility of’ rather than ‘stopping’ a disease event.  Preparedness practices do not, as Collier and Lakoff remind us, draw on statistical records of past events.  Rather, they involve “imaginative techniques of enactment such as scenarios, exercises, and analytical models to simulate uncertain future threats” (). A shift of focus occurs, Lakoff argues, from population to infrastructure, from calculation to enactment, from walls to emergency capacity building (), from state planning to what Massumi has called an affective attunement (; ).  For others this is a characteristic ‘neoliberal’ withdrawal from state-sponsored welfare planning, with emergence and associated unpredictability forming a truth claim or ontological basis for a shift from calculative to more speculative and pre-emptive modes of governance ().

Our point, for now, is to note this shift in the ways in which events are conceived as increasingly unpredictable and, through their circulatory or ecological nature, less manageable (), but also to mark the degree to which, first, most of the attention has been on the temporal register (the shift from predictability to radically uncertain futures ()) and, second, to underline that, despite this shift, the geometric disease model tends to remain relatively unproblematised.  That is, disease preparedness planning is still largely focused on outbreaks or sudden incursions of pathogens into a population.  Even though outbreaks are no longer amenable to statistics or risk assessment, and are rendered as unpredictable, there is a latent territorialism here with disease periodically puncturing normal life.  So while the response to disease may have expanded registers to incorporate the anticipatory with even the pre-emptive development of laboratory viruses and vaccines, it is notable that disease itself still seems to operate over geometric space, and healthy life can only be defined by the absence of disease.

In sum, the necessary imperfection of spatial barriers and their paradoxical qualities, together with the limits to statistical mappings of life, suggest that biosecurity, its academic framing and its practical arrangements, struggles to be conceived within a largely geometric or topographical framework. Biosecurity threats do not fall neatly outside borderlines drawn between healthy and unhealthy bodies.  Yet the sense in which disease extends over or moves across space leaving in its wake a pattern of contamination or contagion is a hard image to shift, as are its markers of presence and absence. A more flexible response to the territorial rigidities that underpin this image has been to conceive of the mutability of disease, its adaptability and elusiveness, in terms of networks rather than blocs of infection. This can act as a prompt to think about how disease can be diagrammed differently, as part of a borderland, rather than simply mapped through a series of etched borderlines, but as we shall see, such a step is still largely taken on geometric ground. 

Biosecurity Borderlands
If the past has become a poor guide to the future, it is also the case that territorial space has become a partial guide to disease distributions and their governance.  If “the state imagines the disease as a foreign threat” (), the threat is nevertheless increasingly re-imagined as a result of networked processes.  So, as a pig incubates an H1N1 swine flu virus in La Gloria, Mexico (allegedly the outbreak site for a newly transmissible swine flu) at an intensive pig farm owned by Smithfield foods, in March 2009, in May of that year a school in the UK in Handsworth, Birmingham reports 79 cases of swine flu.  Such ‘jumps’ and re-foci are characteristic of contagious disease episodes.  The contagion combines international transport, intense physical contact and a raft of vulnerabilities (from seasonality to presence of co-infections, and from genetic to age profiles of a population) to produce a complex incidence pattern, which seems to be a manifestation of increasingly dense networks or associations.  In this section we work from this networked imaginary, to distinguish between topographies of networked life and the topologies that are more characteristic of a mutable disease environment.

As a consequence of disease networks, biosecurity is often thought about as something that is exported and extended, with pre-emptive strikes by powerful states on distanced outsiders in order to modernise or wall up agricultural forms and build up surveillance capacity elsewhere ().  Much of this takes the form of large capital investment in biosecure agriculture in newly industrialising states, with attempts to develop disease free zones having the added advantage of promising access to global food commodity markets within otherwise ‘diseased’ nation state territories ().  This civilising mission, as King has put it, marks an extension of state and corporate networks in the name of biosecurity at home (), and in the name of market expansion. 

This geography of disease and response networks extended over space conforms to what Wald has called an outbreak narrative; the familiar story of the sudden and speedy emergence of disease checks to a population and the progressive enclosure of healthy life.  We have already mentioned the imagined geography that this entails, but it is worth re-stating that “the “primitive farms” of Guangzou, like the “primordial” spaces of African rainforests, temporalize the threat of emerging infections, proclaiming the danger of putting the past in (geographical) proximity with the present” ().  The coming plague (), even if aided and abetted by a globalised network, remains an arrival at ‘our’ door, from an elsewhere.  The elsewhere is then the target object for new borderlines, reproducing logics of colonial and economic power.

As such, the network metaphor can only take us so far.  Indeed, it tends to reproduce a form of spatial thinking that remains, at root, Euclidean and geometrical.  For a disease network tends to imply that a disease simply moves out over and across space.  It has an extensive reach which can be mapped, and, in turn, the threat it poses is answered by a similarly far-reaching state.  Disease, though, as we have had cause to stress, is rarely simply a matter of spatial incursion of pathogens from a diseased elsewhere making their way over and into a healthy population. Being healthy may not simply mean being free from pathogens, but a matter of immunocompetence; that is, the ability to live with a variety of other organisms that are always in circulation. This, in contrast to an infectious model of disease, starts to open up a relational understanding, one that does not oppose a healthy to a diseased body. Life, on this view, becomes necessarily pathological, echoing Foucault’s remark that‘[t]he idea of disease attacking life must be replaced by a denser notion of pathological life’ ().  Disease, in this sense, becomes less about contamination and contagion, and more concerned with its systemic and endemic co-generation  ADDIN EN.CITE (; ; ).
 
In order to avoid a simple geometrical re-telling of the spread of networked disease, then, it may be more helpful to emphasise the intra-actions that make disease a possibility in the first place.  Pathogens, when seen in this light, do not simply spread out from a mappable location or source, and nor do they merely diffuse across space. They intra-act (to use Barad’s term ()) to the extent that they not only mutate as they move, they also drift (through accumulating mutations) and reassort through all manner of transfections, transductions and transformations.  In this version of network-ing (the active verb has always been important in, for example, actor-network theory ()) the virulence of a flu, for example, will depend on the virus’ ability to locate target cells (especially in the respiratory tract) and an ability to direct virus manufacture.  Even slight informational changes can trigger a highly transmissible and even pathological conformation, but the possible rearrangements of viral organisation makes any prognosis difficult.  This rearrangement, which rests upon a relational understanding of disease, is a product of the entangled interplay of environments, hosts, pathogens and humans. 

Significantly, for our argument, such rearrangements are expressed through spatial intension rather than spatial extension; that is, they emerge through the intensity of the relationships which compose the spaces of which they are a part, rather than through their extended distribution in a networked space (). This is not a world of flat surfaces, with well-defined proximities to sources of infection marked accordingly, but rather a topological landscape of embeddings and disembeddings, where disease registers its presence through the density of its intra-actions.  Similarly, disease response, state sponsored or otherwise, is not something we should necessarily imagine in terms of networks extending over space.  As we will show, it is the intra-actions of micro-organisms, environments, knowledge practices and institutions that characterise responses.  It is to this topological register that we now turn.

Disease topologies
A topological sensibility prompts us to do two things: first, to think about proximity, presence and distance in ways that disrupt our sense of what is near and what is far, and, second, to disrupt the notion that pathogens or disease refer to discrete, unchanging objects that retain the same form regardless of their diffusion over space. For the first insight, we owe much to Deleuze (1993, 1995), but perhaps especially to a conversation between Serres and Latour () which captured this disruption through the analogy of the crumpled surfaces of a handkerchief once folded and stuffed into our pocket (see ; ). Where the flat, well-ironed surfaces of a handkerchief stand in for a geometry of fixed distances and defined borders, the fabric, once folded, draws together threads previously held apart and vice versa. In a topological vein, weaves of cloth that were once close are now distant and, conversely, points previously at separate ends of the handkerchief are now in contact with one another. In much the same way, the potential for reassortments and rearrangements make disease circumjacent; that is, a constant and proximate threat to health.  A viral threat that was previously thought to be distant may suddenly turn out to be close. Significantly, the apparent absence of disease at one moment in time, in one place, is not necessarily an indication that it is not present. Indeed, the intensity of all that is entangled may act as ‘tipping point’​[1]​ for the presence of a disease 

On the second point, there is a durability to disease topologies that nonetheless allows for continual transformation; where, for instance, the viral elements retain their integrity despite the many spatial twists and turns undergone. In topological terms, such elements are said to be homeomorphic; that is, they may mutate and reassort, yet still retain certain qualities despite the tangled arrangements and distortions that they are subjected to. Infectious agents, in that sense, are a set of potential forms actualized only in relation to the environments engaged. They endure, yet change in different ways, depending upon the nature of the intra-actions involved. In conventional topological terms, the shape and size of things or the distance between them is less significant than the relationships which tie them together (). There is no fixed geometry to any of this, nor any extended movement across space that can be mapped or measured, only a diagrammatic sense, to use Saskia Sassen’s phrase, of a ‘dense and complex borderland marked by the intersection of multiple spatio-temporal [dis]orders’ (Sassen, 2006). What she is alluding to here is the possibility of spaces in the making, frontier zones as she calls them, where borders are continually being restated through the juxtaposition of different elements, some close up, others folded in from afar, detached and re-embedded in ways that give rise to new and novel arrangements through different types of engagement. Disease is not Sassen’s concern, but her depiction of a borderlands, a topological space by our reckoning, where contrasting elements working to different rhythms and logics come together, or better still, intra-act, captures nicely the intense landscape of the disease relationships between humans and non-humans.

It is a landscape in which borders are detached from geographic territory, where the border can be embedded in pathogenic life itself, rather than at the edge of territories. It is a landscape of potential ‘tipping points’ rather than ‘breach points’, where zoonotic disease can erupt as quickly as it may dissipate, or mutate in ways that defy easy prognosis.  So how does this help us to understand disease and the attempts to make life safe?  Diseases gain their effectiveness, we argue, not through extension along a network, but through the intensities and densities of intra-actions.  And similarly, making life safe is less a matter of extending a will to closure but learning to respond to the relational character of diseases.  To demonstrate, we return to our empirical engagement with avian life in poultry houses and on wetlands.

Topological ‘tipping points’
Since the late 1970s, a bacterium, Campylobacter spp., has risen from relative obscurity to become the number one reported cause of food borne illness in the UK, and an international health issue.  The bacterium has been opportunistic, adapting to and thriving as poultry production has itself changed complexion.  Worldwide poultry production has tripled in the last three decades, with a global population of chicken alone now estimated at 19 billion ().  Added to this accumulation of mass is an acceleration of throughput, with broilers (the vast majority of the population) going to slaughter at around 38-45 days (50 years ago the more typical figure was 90 days). This industrial shift has been made possible by breeding and feeding technologies.  It has driven worldwide markets in chicken meat and derived products, themselves related to growth in worldwide animal protein based diets, as well as changes in cooking, eating and living habits in wealthier regions ().  To service these demands at low cost, the birds are increasingly housed together in concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs).  There is increasing uniformity in terms of their genetic make-up, and they are part of circulatory lives that are patched together through vertically integrated movements of egg stock, breed stock and through the mobility of chicken product in the food, feed and fertiliser trades. 

Intense production and the progressive repression of competing microbial fauna including Salmonella has provided the perfect niche for Campylobacter, which has become a commensal species of high throughput, rapidly growing poultry.  Thriving in conditions of intense physiological change in which immune systems are commonly compromised, Campylobacter is also successful in high stress environments wherein already compromised birds seem to produce the necessary physio-chemical conditions for the bacterium to spread both within the body (its uptake from the gut to muscles) and throughout the concentrated population ().  A typical UK poultry house of 10,000-30,000 birds can, as a result, become positive for Campylobacter almost overnight.  This disease is not therefore characterised so much by its presence or absence, but by the degree to and manner in which it is expressed.

The process of thinning further aids the introduction, as well as the intra-action, of pathogen and chicken.  Thinning involves the management of stocking densities in order to maximise cost-effectiveness and meet animal welfare standards.  Poultry houses are generally stocked at standard densities measured in mass per area.  As the birds grow, this stocking reaches legal limits and so the house is thinned when the birds are approximately 37 days old.  At this point the birds, having been used to normal day and night routines and continuous food and water availability, are sleep deprived for twenty-four hours and have feeders and watering removed before a sub-contracted catching team working under tight margins and time constraints removes a first ‘harvest’, 15-25% of the stock​[2]​.  The remaining birds can then develop greater body weight before the main catch a week or so later without exceeding standard stocking rates.  It is these remaining birds that are most susceptible to Campylobacter, having been deprived of feed, possibly stressed by the catch, at a life stage whereby maternally derived immunity is at its least effective and exposed to the catching team (and their equipment) who move from farm to farm. 

In this example we not only see the ways in which barrier systems are necessarily breached within the normal running of the business, we also see the intense relations that exist within the poultry industry which places disease management and animal welfare alongside cost effectiveness and retailer pressure to minimise unit price.  Disease here is not so much ‘at the door’​[3]​ but incubated through the highly charged process of producing food that the industry would claim is affordable.  Disease is part and parcel of an entangled set of logics and practices that produce poultry, from the disembedded just-in-time imperatives of the supermarkets and the distinctive rhythms of a mobile sub-contract labour force to the biochemical environment of avian guts and an animal welfare regime that operates according to its own logic.  Instead of breaches of a wall it may thus be more useful to think of ‘tipping points’, or intense moments of folding, where disease is being made.

Campylobacter is not an outbreak, but a parasitic breeding, a fermentation within and alongside food production.  And it is not an isolated case.  Disease outbreak narratives, their measured spaces and their disease geographies, often fail to isolate single disease factors, incursions or construct linear aetiologies. The swine flu pandemic may well have been traced to Mexico, but it was also at a CAFO subcontracted to an international conglomerate in La Gloria where re-assortment seemed to take place.  Meanwhile, in the UK, H5N1 has not so much threatened to break in from outside, but break out from intensive poultry houses.  Here, official epidemiological reports on avian flu events seem repeatedly unable to locate or pinpoint the biosecurity breach in the wall and deal instead in the complexity of mobilities and interconnections that characterise the poultry industry (; ).  Our point, though, is not to change the target for the epidemiological gaze, but rather to highlight how disease and health is best understood topologically, not topographically, as a landscape of ‘tipping points’ where what is always already present, much of it drawn from elsewhere, has the potential to upend pathologically.

Absent presences
If disease can be diagrammed topologically, so too can the knowledge required to understand and act on disease.  Indeed, our fieldwork on disease surveillance suggests that understanding a disease threat relies on loosely coupled knowledge practices, rather than a tightly orchestrated, centralised surveillance system ().  In part, this relates to the mutable nature of disease and the environments within which it becomes entangled.  So, within the surveillance of avian influenza in poultry, for example, the surveillance target is not a highly pathological virus (whose detection would already be too late to implement anything more than alleviation and containment).  Rather, blood samples from poultry are screened for antibodies to low pathogenic influenzas that have potential to develop into more dangerous forms.  This is not so much about the absence or presence of a known pathogen, but an engagement with the topological twists and turns, the presence/absence of virtual viruses, or more strictly, their signature traces which mark antigenic and antibody intra-actions with their hosts.  To be sure, in the UK, statutory containment measures can only be implemented once a notifiable disease virus is made present (and is produced through laboratory diagnostics), yet we shouldn’t lose sight of the work involved in engaging with the topological spaces of viruses.  It generates knowledge of disease dynamics and so undermines any sense of a once and for all closure to fixed viral entities.  Again, disease is not so much absent or present, but a continuing, if virtual, presence/absence.

Surveillance for avian influenza within wild populations of birds is similarly about more than the extension of domestic power over (wild) life.  In order to provide the kinds of knowledge required to understand the movements of disease within and through avian life, ornithological and virological practices need to be brought together.  But this is not a straightforward co-option of knowledge with ornithology simply extending state knowledge.  Co-option would do too much damage to the intricacies that are required to know birds and their pathologies.  Indeed, ornithology and to some extent virology are marked by their observational rather than surveillant modality, an openness to the new and a learning to be affected by bird and viral life.  Understanding disease requires the preservation of these different practices, not their absorption into a coherent or centralised programme.  This looser collective of practices is vital, we would argue, if surveillance is to maintain a level of responsiveness to new diseases, to surprises and to new intra-actions of avian life and their pathologies (). Statistical or risk based surveillance may therefore be supplemented with other forms of knowledge of avian and viral life in order to avoid rigid and unresponsive structures.  Our point is that the organisation of disease knowledge is less like a centralised or scalable system and more topological, intertwining new and old practices, and folding cultures and natures in novel ways.  

We have argued against an approach to biosecurity that is simply fixated on borderlines and their implementation or varying levels of compliance, and for a focus on the borderlands wherein pathogens, hosts, knowledge practices and others beside intra-act to make life more or less safe.  That requires us to understand the relational qualities of disease and to capture in a diagrammatic way the topological spaces produced by their entangled interplay. In the concluding section, we draw out the implications of this line of argument for our understanding of biopolitics and biosecurity.

Towards a Biopolitics for Biosecurity
The consequence of the argument so far is a re-direction of biosecurity efforts such that a fixation with barriers, and even reductions in ‘invasibility’ through enhanced resilience (), are replaced by a concern with intensities.  This is not, it should be said, a concern simply with the intensification of agriculture (although that is one issue), but the more general point that disease and the responses to it are marked more by intense entanglements of hosts, environments and institutions than a simple geometry of fixed objects invading pure, or more or less resilient, spaces.  In this final section, we want to trace the ways in which biopolitical thinking can inform and in turn be adapted to this re-diagramming of disease.  To be clear, this is not so much an attempt to engage in detail with the large literature which takes forward Foucault’s initial specification of a biopolitics, but is rather an argument for a politics of life that emerges from the notion of biosecurity borderlands, or a topological sensitivity to pathological life.

For us, biopolitics draws attention to shifts in the governing of life.  The register and object of reference for biopolitics was, initially at least, not the people but a territorially less precise population, a risk pool “literally inscribed through number, tabulation and calculation” ().  Through surveillance and accumulation of data, populations allowed for discernible patterns, for calculable probabilities, such that life could be regulated through its evental qualities.  This is what Foucault meant when referring to biopolitics as taking control of life through its regularization ().  And yet, as becomes clear in Foucault’s later work, populations are embedded in an expanding space of circulation with the result that the promotion of life is always in tension with its regulation (; ).  To make life live requires attending to the events and circulations which both make it possible (from blood circulating in bodies to the circulation of money and trade) but which also pose the greatest dangers to its continuity.  As Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero summarise astutely, security in this aleatory world of complex circulations cannot afford to be prophylactic, or aiming to preserve and protect life, but is instead concerned with “securing the contingent freedom of circulation” ().  Note that this is rather different to the sense that Foucault sometimes invokes of biopolitics being concerned with sorting good and bad circulations ().  As we have demonstrated, sorting the good from the bad can simply mean an extension of networks over space in order to enclose circulations by walling in so-called good life.  Such sorting relies on a politics of identities and fixed objects, territories and known enemies, all of which are rendered less stable as life endures through its continuous transformations.  In nudging forward our understanding of biopolitics and by engaging with changing understandings of life, including those that we would call topological, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero open up the matter of control, loosening it from notions of power over life and geometrical space.  Indeed, their account of contingency includes what we take to be an exemplary description of an entangled pathological life, as “that which endures by moving out of phase with itself as it transacts complex negotiations” ().  

Our sense is that biopolitics can speak directly to the issue of pathological life and its topologies that we raise in this paper.  To be clear this goes further than affirming the powers of life, even those that are fermented through a misplaced faith in the powers over life.  Indeed, it has to, given that the current ‘disease emergency’ is so often framed in terms of the emergence of excessive life sometimes as a result of excessive government (or the pursuit of maximum safety), followed by a claim for reductions in health spending ().  While part of our argument is the secret breeding that goes on in a neatly bordered world (we are not so modern, see ; ), with Campylobacter and zoonotic influenzas our exemplary cases, we can and should go further.  

Just as it is insufficient to deny the excesses of life by invoking the inevitability of control, it is also important to ask the question of how it is possible that a power of life is so frequently, in historical terms, exercised against itself ().  How, in our terms, are the intensities of the living arranged such that life becomes less rather than more safe?  Here the emergency changes from one of emergent life threatening the cordoned off spaces of the healthy, to an emergency produced as healthy life is reduced to mere life; that is, life that is deprived of qualities and lived at the biological threshold ().  Indeed, as Honig reminds us, making mere life, in our examples through the progressive enclosure of good life and its circulations, is always going on hand in hand with making more life through continuously expanding circulations, and we would argue, intensifying entanglements.  Disease free zones are therefore both interminable survival () in the sense of an enclosed ‘mere’ life, but also interminable over-life (sur-vivance) that is the intense assemblage of sub-contracted labour, retailers, animal bodies, bio and food securities, surveillance and ecology.  Our point is that mere life and more life always intra-act, with contingent results.

This, then, is a politics of life that is not equivalent to Foucault’s bio-politics, even while it draws on its most important insights in terms of circulation and contingency.  As suggested, we want to go further, to use the insights from our empirical work on both the production of and responses to emerging disease in order to shift the emergency from ‘outbreaks’ to the one that is caused, but not solved, by the ‘mere’ life aims of scaleable biosecurity.   It is a diagrammatic approach to biopolitics involving the serious analysis of ontologies that are churned together on a daily basis, actively using the ensuing contingencies to open up a new emergency ().  By re-imagining these geographies of infection through the topological spaces of the borderland, rather than the fixed geometry of borderlines, we can perhaps start to make real interventions into biosecure politics.

Our aim throughout this paper has not only been to demonstrate the impracticality of closure and to highlight its paradoxical effects, but also to challenge the spatial assumptions that adhere to conventional understandings of disease, to biosecurity and, more broadly, to governing life, and so to call for a different kind of biopolitics; one that confronts the intensities that are involved as good or healthy life is reduced to mere life, and as this model is rolled out in the UK and beyond. When the powers of life fold over into the power over life and actively threaten life itself, it brings into focus the contingent intra-actions that lie behind a relational understanding of disease, and the intensity of the entanglements at play. Our point is captured in a call for a shift of biosecurity discourse and practice from breach points to tipping points, and in a bid to re-frame the questions concerning biosecurity in order to work with the bio-politics of a pathological life.
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^1	  We’re conscious that tipping points have a particular set of meanings within ecological and systems based disciplines.  We are not necessarily interested here in marking phase changes or ‘points’ as such, but with the broad metaphor of over-filling life at the same time as reducing its diversity.
^2	  The figure varies depending on initial stocking rates and company planning and logistics.  The field work for this section has included interviews with catching companies, processors, micro-biologists and participant observation of two catches.
^3	  The metaphor recurs as we have seen, but has most recently been used by Mike Davis.  To be fair to Davis, his ‘monster at our door’ is a similar one to the processes we are tracing, in that he lays the charge that disease threats from high intensity agriculture are overlooked.  The monster is already with ‘us’, so to speak.  Davis, M. (2005). The Monster at our Door: The Global Threat of Avian Flu. New York, The New Press.
